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NOTES
Criminal Defendants' Waiver of the Right to Appeal-An
Unacceptable Condition of a Negotiated Sentence or
Plea Bargain
In 1985, Darrell Smith was indicted for second degree assault, reck-
less endangerment, and criminal possession of a weapon. A second in-
dictment charged him with first degree robbery and third degree grand
larceny. Before trial, Smith and the prosecutor plea bargained.' Smith
agreed to plead guilty to first degree robbery and attempted second de-
gree criminal possession of a weapon in exchange for consecutive
sentences of two and one-half to seven and one-half years for the robbery
charge and one to three years for the weapons charge. The prosecution
further required that Smith waive his right to appeal from the plea-based
conviction. Smith agreed, and a New York trial court entered judgment
against him. Smith later attempted to appeal his conviction, asserting
that his sentence was excessive. The Appellate Division dismissed his
appeal, however, since the prosecution had obtained a valid waiver of
Smith's right to appeal.
In 1986, Alan Seaberg was indicted for two felony counts of operat-
ing a motor vehicle while intoxicated. The first count of the indictment
charged him with the operation of a vehicle while he had a blood alcohol
content of .1 or more. The second count charged him with operating a
vehicle while in an intoxicated condition. Seaberg's case proceeded to
trial. The jury found him guilty of the offense charged in count one, and
of the lesser included offense of driving while impaired- charged in count
two. At the time of sentencing, the prosecution negotiated with Seaberg,
and agreed to a lenient sentence in exchange for Seaberg's agreement to
waive his right to appeal. Seaberg subsequently appealed his conviction,
asserting several trial errors which he claimed warranted reversal of his
conviction. However, since Seaberg had waived his right to appeal as
1 In a plea bargain the prosecution and defense engage in discussions h6ping to reach an agree-
ment in which the defendant pleads guilty. The prosecutor, as well as the defendant or defense
counsel, may initiate this process. Plea agreements involve concessions by both the prosecution and
defense. The "most common" concessions that prosecutors make are reduction or dismissal of the
charge, sentence recommendation, and agreement not to oppose a requested sentence. J. BOND,
PLEA BARGAINING & GUILTY PLEAS (2d ed. 1982). Less significant concessions include charging as a
juvenile rather than as an adult, and agreeing to a particular place of confinement. Id. On the other
hand, the agreement to plead guilty is the defendant's "strongest bargaining chip." Id. at 1-20.
Other bargaining chips include agreeing to make restitution, promising to divulge information, aid-
ing in the investigation of a crime, and testifying as a witness. Id at 1-21. The Supreme Court
expressly approved plea bargaining in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). See also
Santobello v. New York 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) (where the Court refers to plea bargaining as "not
only an essential part of the process but a highly desirable part").
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part of the sentence negotiation, the Appellate Division dismissed his
appeal.
2
On June 15, 1989, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Ap-
pellate Division's dismissals of the appeals in these two cases.3 In People
v. Seaberg,4 the Court of Appeals confronted the issue of whether criminal
defendants may validly waive their rights to appeal as part of a negotiated
sentence or plea bargain.5 The court, noting that it saw no basis for dis-
tinguishing between the two situations presented in the two cases, 6 held
that defendants may waive the right to appeal as a condition of either a
sentence negotiation or a plea bargain.
7
In People v. Smith,8 the defendant waived his right to appeal during
plea bargaining before trial. In People v. Seaberg,9 the defendant waived
his right to appeal during sentence negotiations after trial.' 0 The recent
New York Court of Appeals case, People v. Seaberg, which consolidated
these two cases, illustrates a criminal defendant's waiver of the right to
appeal at two different stages in the criminal justice system. This Note
argues that criminal defendants' waiver of the right to appeal, made pur-
suant to a condition of either a plea bargain or a negotiated sentence
should be invalid., In addition, this Note illustrates the significant differ-
ences that exist between the post-trial negotiated sentence stage and the
pre-trial plea bargain stage, and suggests that the reasons for invalidating
such waivers are even more compelling at the negotiated sentence stage.
Part I of this Note discusses the history of the right to appeal. Part II
examines the arguments that American courts have advanced, pro and
con, regarding appeal waivers during plea bargains and negotiated
sentences. Part III presents the arguments against allowing waivers of
the right to appeal in these contexts. These arguments include: (1) a
consideration of the due process restrictions on inducing such waivers;
(2) an analysis of the policy implications of appeal waivers, including effi-
ciency concerns, the impact on the development of the common law, and
the effect on judicial integrity; and (3) an explanation of the effect such
waivers have on habeas corpus relief. Finally, Part IV of this Note ex-
plains why the waiver of the right to appeal is particularly objectionable
at the sentence negotiation stage.
I. History of the Right to Appeal
The right to appeal is relatively new to both the English and Ameri-
can legal systems. In fact, the right to appeal did not exist in England
2 These facts are paraphrased from People v. Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d 1, 541 N.E.2d 1022, 543
N.Y.S.2d 968 (1989).
3 Id. at 5, 541 N.E.2d at 1023, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 969.
4 Id. at 1, 541 N.E.2d at 1022, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 968.
5 Id. at 5, 541 N.E.2d at 1023, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 969.
6 Id. at 10, 541 N.E.2d at 1026, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 972.
7 Id. at 5, 541 N.E.2d at 1023, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 969.
8 142 A.D.2d 195, 535 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1988), aff'd sub nom. People v. Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d 1, 541
N.E.2d 1022, 543 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1989).
9 139 A.D.2d 53, 530 N.Y.S.2d 278 (1988), aff'd, 74 N.Y.2d 1, 541 N.E.2d 1022, 543 N.Y.S.2d
968 (1989).
10 Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d at 5, 541 N.E.2d at 1023, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 969.
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until 1907.11 As the Court in Carroll v. United States 12 noted, "[i]t was 100
years [after the ratification of the Constitution] before the defendant in a
criminal case, even a capital case, was afforded appellate review as of
right."' 3 Nonetheless, that the right to appeal is relatively new in no way
diminishes its importance. As Yale law professor, Harlon L. Dalton
writes, "[a]lthough its origins are neither constitutional nor ancient, the
right has become, in a word, sacrosanct." 14  Dalton explains that
"[d]uring the past decade of high anxiety over the burdens placed on our
judicial system by what has fairly been termed a litigation explosion, the
basic right to take an appeal has remained virtually untouched."' 15
The number ofjurisdictions in the United States that grant a defend-
ant the right to appeal illustrates the importance of this right. Currently,
defendants have some right to appeal in forty-eight states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia as well as in federal courts. 16 Among the states, only
West Virginia and New Hampshire have not granted appeal as a matter
of right.
17
11 The right to appeal was created in England by statute, 7 Edw. VII, ch. 23 § I. Under the
statute, "any prisoner, convicted on indictment, may with the leave, either of the tribunal itself or the
Court which tried him, appeal on grounds of fact, or mixed law and fact, or any other ground,
against his conviction." Id.
12 354 U.S. 394 (1957).
13 Id. at 400. The Court explained:
The Act of February 6, 1889, 25 Stat. 656, authorized direct review in the Supreme Court
by writ of error "in all cases of conviction of crime the punishment of which provided by law
is death, tried before any court of the United States .... Two years later, the Circuit
Courts of Appeals Act extended the jurisdiction for direct review to all "cases of conviction
of a capital or otherwise infamous crime." 26 Stat. 827. The burden upon this Court of
hearing the large number of criminal cases led, in 1897, to transfer of the jurisdiction over
convictions in noncapital cases to the Circuit Courts of Appeals. 29 Star. 1157. Section 238
of the Judicial Code completed the retrenchment in 1911 by eliminating direct review of
capital cases. 36 Star. 1157.
Id. at 400 n.9.
14 Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L. J. 62 (1985).
15 Id. at 62.
16 See Federal, 28 U.S.C. 1291 (1982); CODE OF ALA. § 12-22-130 (1986); ALASKA STAT.
§ 22.05.010 (1988); ARIZ. CONsT. art. 2 § 24; ARK. CONsT. art. 7 § 33; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1237, sub
1 (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-12-101 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-94(a) (1985); DEL.
CONsT. art. IV § 28 (1897); D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-721(b) (1988); FLA. CONsT. art. V § 5(3) (1968
Rev.); GA. CODE ANN. § 6-701 (1975); HAw. REV. STAT. § 641-11 (1988); IDAHO CODE § 19-2801
(1987); ILL. CONsT. art. VI § 6 (1971); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-4-1 (Burns 1985); IowA CODE ANN.
§ 814.6 (West 1978); Ky. CONST. § 115 (Baldwin 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3602(a) (Vernon
1987); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 911 (West 1966); ME. R. CRIM. PROC. 36 (1989); MD. ANN.
CODE § 12-301 (1984); MAss. GEN. L. ANN. Ch. 278 § 28 (West 1979); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§ 770.3 (West 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 590.06 (West 1986); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-35-1 (1968);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 28.03 (1953); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-20-104 (1989); NEB. CT. R. & PROC. § 29-
2301; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 177.015 (Michie 1981); N.J. CONsT. art. 6 § 5, par. 2 (1947); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-11-14 (1987 RepI.); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 460.10; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-
1431 (1989); N.D. CRIM. PROC. R. 37 (1983); OHIo REV.'CODE ANN. § 2953.02 (Baldwin 1970); OKLA
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1051 (1970); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-138.020 (1983); PA. CONST. art. 5 § 9;
R.I. GEN. LAws § 12-22-1 (1981); S.C. CODE § 17-27-100 (1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 23A-
32-2 (1988 Rev.); TENN. CRIM. PROC. R. 37 (1984); TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE § 44.02 (Amended
1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-26 (1980); VT. STAT. ANN. 'tit. 13 § 7401 (1973); Vii. CONsT. art. I
§ 8; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.01.010 (1891); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 974.02 (West 1983); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 7-12-101 (1977).
17 One commentator, Robert L. Stern, writes that "[o]nly New Hampshire and West Virginia,
which have no intermediate appellate courts, do not provide for'an appeal as of right from final
judgments in the trial courts of general jurisdiction." R. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED
STATES 13 (2d ed. 1989). In both New Hampshire and West Virginia, the state supreme court has
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II. Current State of Law with Respect to Appeal Waivers
When criminal defendants waive the right to appeal in a plea bargain
or negotiated sentence, "courts have reached differing results as to the
validity of such a waiver."18 Of those courts that have considered the
issue, a majority have held such waivers valid.' 9
A. Courts Holding Waiver of Appeal Valid
Many courts that have upheld the validity of appeal waivers, have
done so simply on the ground that the defendant knowingly and volunta-
rily entered into such waiver. Little reasoning is given to support the
holdings. 20 By focusing on the defendant's volition and knowledge,
these courts fail to address the issue of whether such waivers ought to be
permitted in the first place.
Other courts, however, have used more thorough reasoning in mak-
ing the decision to uphold a defendant's appeal waiver. One commonly
advanced explanation analogizes to other rights a criminal defendant
may waive. 21 Since a criminal defendant may waive other constitutional
rights at various points in the criminal justice system (i.e. the right to a
jury trial22, the privilege against self-incrimination 23, etc.) there is no rea-
son why a defendant cannot similarly waive the statutory right to appeal.
24
These courts see no distinction between the waiver of the right to appeal
and the waiver of other rights which courts commonly recognize.
In a related argument, advanced by at least one court, a comparison
is drawn between the situation in which the state provides sentence and
charge concessions in return for a guilty plea, and that in which defend-
ants waive the right to appeal in return for similar concessions. 25 The
court argued that since the former situation is not said to "chill" a de-
fendant's exercise of the right to trial, then the latter situation cannot
rightly be said to "chill" a defendant's right to appeal.
26
the discretion to deny review. This system is similar to the certiorari procedure of the United States
Supreme Court. However, one fundamental difference is noted by Carrington, Meadow, and Rosen-
berg: "Whereas the Supreme Court of the United States exercises its discretion after at least one
appeal has already been heard by other judges .... [in West Virginia and New Hampshire, since]
there is no intermediate state appellate court ... [the courts] can not assume that there has been
compliance with the imperatives of appellate justice." P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG,
JUSTICE ON APPEAL 132-133 (1976).
18 Annotation, Validity and Effect of Criminal Defendant's Express Waiver of Right to Appeal As Part of
Negotiated Plea Agreement, 89 A.L.R.3d 864, 866 (1979).
19 See id.
20 See, e.g., Barnes v. Lynaugh, 817 F.2d 336 (5th Cir. 1987); State v. McKinney, 406 So.2d 160
(La. 1981); People v. Williams, 143 A.D.2d 162, 531 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1988); People v. Smith, 141
A.D.2d 988, 531 N.Y.S.2d 38 (1988); People v. Juliano, 74 A.D.2d 881, 426 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1980);
People v. Jasper, 107 Misc.2d 992, 436 N.Y.S.2d 185 (Sup. Ct. 1981).
21 See, e.g., People v. Charles, 171 Cal. App. 3d 552, 217 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1985); People v.
Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d 1, 541 N.E.2d 1022, 543 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1989).
22 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
23 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
24 Charles, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 558-59, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 406; Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d at 7, 541 N.E.2d
at 1024, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 970.
25 See, e.g., State v. Gibson, 68 N.J.499, 348 A.2d 769 (1975). For typical concessions made by
the state, see supra note 1.
26 Id. at 510, 348 A.2d at 774.
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Some courts uphold appeal waivers based on the importance of plea
bargaining in our criminal justice system. 27 Plea bargaining has become
vital to the efficient administration of criminal justice because it pro-
motes the prompt and final resolution of criminal cases. 28 The public's
interest in finality, which underlies plea bargaining, is furthered by en-
forcing waivers of a defendant's right to appeal.2 9 The courts in these
cases suggest that the interests of plea bargaining will be best served
when appeal waiver agreements are enforced.30 Similarly, some courts
are concerned that holding such waivers invalid would discourage plea
negotiation.3 '
Some courts uphold the appeal waiver in negotiated plea agree-
ments, in part, because they can find no public policy dictating against
such a waiver.
32
Finally, some courts have found an "implicit" waiver of the right to
appeal within the terms of the plea agreement. An "implicit" waiver of
the right to appeal arises in cases in which there has been no "explicit"
waiver by the defendant, but nevertheless the terms of the agreement
between the defendant and the prosecutor are such that a waiver, in fact,
occurs. A typical example is a plea-bargain in which the prosecutor
agrees to drop certain other pending charges against the defendant, but
only after the appeal period has run on the plea-based conviction. The
defendant never expressly waives the right to appeal but, in effect, the
same result is achieved.3 3 Those courts that have upheld the validity of
such conditions have argued that these conditions do not deprive de-
fendants of the right to appeal; the defendants may still appeal their con-
victions despite any consequences that would flow from such appeals.
3 4
B. Courts Holding Waiver of Appeal Invalid
Among the courts finding that the waiver of the right to appeal is an
invalid condition of a plea agreement, the most common argument ad-
vanced is that, for various reasons, such waivers transgress public policy.
Some courts argue that an important state interest is to provide appellate
review to criminal defendants and that no legitimate state interest is fur-
thered by its waiver.35 Courts have said that the right to appellate review
27 See, e.g., Charles, 171 Cal. App. 3d 552, 217 Cal. Rptr. 402; Weatherford v. Commonwealth,
703 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1986); Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d 1, 541 N.E.2d 1022, 543 N.Y.S.2d 968.
28 Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d at 7, 541 N.E.2d at 1024, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 970; Charles, 171 Cal. App. 3d at
558, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
29 Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d at 10, 541 N.E.2d at 1026, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 972; Charles, 171 Cal. App. 3d at
560-61, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
30 Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d at 10, 541 N.E.2d at 1026, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 972.
31 See, e.g., Gibson, 68 N.J. 499, 348 A.2d 769.
32 See, e.g., Charles, 171 Cal. App. 3d 552, 217 Cal. Rptr. 402; Gibson, 68 NJ. 499, 348 A.2d 769;
Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d 1, 541 N.E.2d 1022, 543 N.Y.S.2d 968.
33 See generally Annotation, Defendant's Appeal From Plea Conviction as Affected by Prosecutor's Failure or
Refusal to Dismiss Other Pending Charges, Pursuant to Plea Agreement, Until Expiration of Time for Appeal, 86
A.L.R.3d 1262 (1978); Schmidt, Criminal Procedure-Plea Bargaining-Implicit Restrictions on Defendant's
Right of Appeal, 21 WAYNE L. REv. 1161 (1975).
34 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Amuso v. LaVallee, 291 F. Supp. 383 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), aft'd, 427
F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1970); People v. Irizarry, 32 A.D.2d 967, 303 N.Y.S.2d 332 (1969).
35 See, e.g., People v. Ventura, 139 A.D.2d 196, 531 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1988).
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in criminal cases, having become an integral part of the criminal justice
system, is an important right that the state must preserve and promote as
a necessary safeguard within that system.3 6 The state contravenes such a
policy when the prosecution is allowed to actively induce the waiver of
the defendant's right to appeal.
Courts have also reasoned that public policy forbids prosecutors
from insulating themselves from review by bargaining away defendants'
rights to appeal.37 Recognizing the potential for abuse when such con-
victions are effectively insulated from appellate review, as a matter of
public policy courts have allowed defendants to bring an appeal notwith-
standing any agreement to the contrary.38
Expanding upon this argument, some courts have explained that the
prosecution could insulate guilty pleas accepted in violation of the stan-
dards developed to protect criminal defendants' basic rights.39 Consid-
ering the due process concerns that arise when a defendant pleads guilty,
the defendant should not be deterred from exercising the valuable right
to appeal.4
0
Courts in at least one jurisdiction have invalidated such waivers
based on a state constitutional right to appeal.4 1 The courts reasoned
that permitting the prosecution to induce a defendant to waive appellate
rights in exchange for a plea agreement would be constitutionally imper-
missible because it chills the exercise of the defendant's constitutional
right to appeal a criminal conviction.42 Also, the mere fact that such
waivers may render prosecutor/defendant plea agreements more en-
forceable (i.e. a public interest in "finality" is served), does not carry suf-
ficient weight to override a constitutional guarantee. 43 The fact that plea
agreements are now an accepted practice does not mean that the prose-
cution is free to impose any condition on these agreements. 44
With regard to "implicit" waiver conditions, courts have held that
such conditions, in reality, provide the defendant with no meaningful
"choice" to appeal, and therefore effectively insulate the conviction from
appellate review.45 It amounts, in practical effect, to denying the defend-
ant his right to appeal.46
36 See, e.g., Id.; People v. Ramos, 30 A.D.2d 848, 292 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1968).
37 See, e.g., State v. Ethington, 121 Ariz. 572, 592 P.2d 768 (1979); People v. Stevenson, 60 Mich.
App. 614, 231 N.W. 2d 476 (1975).
38 See, e.g., Ethington, 121 Ariz. 572, 592 P.2d 768.
39 See, e.g., People v. Butler, 43 Mich. App. 270, 204 N.W.2d 325 (1972); Ethington, 121 Ariz. 572,
592 P.2d 768.
40 See, e.g., Butler, 43 Mich. App. 270, 204 N.W.2d 325.
41 See People v. Harrison, 386 Mich. 269, 191 N.W.2d 371 (1971); People v. Ledrow, 53 Mich.
App. 511, 220 N.W.2d 336 (1974); Butler, 43 Mich. App. 270, 204 N.W.2d 325. See also MICH.
CONST. art. I, § 20.
42 See, e.g., Harrison, 386 Mich. 269, 191 N.W.2d 371; Butler, 43 Mich. App. 270, 204 N.W.2d 325.
43 Butler, 43 Mich. App. at 281, 204 N.W.2d at 331.
44 Id. at 280-81, 204 N.W.2d at 330.
45 See, e.g., Ledrow, 53 Mich. App. 511, 220 N.W.2d 336; People v. Ramos, 30 A.D.2d 848, 292
N.Y.S.2d 938 (1968).
46 See, e.g., Ramos, 30 A.D.2d at 849, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 940.
[Vol. 65:649
III. The Argument Against Appeal Waivers as a Condition in Plea
Bargains and Negotiated Sentences
A. Due Process Concerns
The Supreme Court has applied the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause 47 to protect a defendant's statutory right to appeal a crim-
inal conviction. 48 The Court has held that unreasonable deterrents or
impediments placed upon the right to appeal violate the defendant's con-
stitutional right to due process.49 The Supreme Court has not reached
the question of whether bargaining away a defendant's right to appeal
constitutes an unreasonable impediment to appellate review.50 -Nonethe-
less, its prior cases dealing with impermissible deterrents to appellate
review point to the conclusion that both explicit and implicit waivers of
the right to appeal made during the plea bargaining process would consti-
tute unconstitutional deterrents to the appellate process.
One of the first instances in which the Supreme Court utilized the
due process clause to protect a defendant's right to appeal a criminal
conviction was Griffin v. Illinois.51 In Griffin, the petitioners alleged that
there had been errors in their trial that entitled, them to have their con-
victions set aside on appeal.52 They argued that the only impediment to
full appellate review of their case was their lack of funds to buy a tran-
script of the trial proceedings.
5 3
The Court, acknowledging the fact that the Constitution does not
require a state to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review
at all, 54 nevertheless found that appellate review had become an integral
part of the Illinois trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or inno-
cence of a defendant. 55 As a result, the appellate stage of the proceed-
ings was protected by the due process clause.56 The Court went on to
note that:
[a]ll of the States now provide some method of appeal from crimi-
nal convictions, recognizing the importance of appellate review to a
correct adjudication of guilt or innocence. Statistics show that a sub-
stantial proportion of criminal convictions are reversed by state appel-
late courts. Thus to deny adequate review ... means that many...
may lose their life, liberty or property because of unjust convictions
which appellate courts would set aside.57
Thus, in Griffin, the Court recognized the important role that the ap-
pellate process plays in the criminal justice system and extended due
47 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
48 Borman, The Chilled Right to Appeal From a Plea Bargain Conviction: A Due Process Cure, 69 Nw. U.
L. REV. 663 (1974).
49 Schmidt, supra note 33, at 1163.
50 Id
51 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
52 Id. at 15.
53 Id A stenographic transcript of the trial proceedings was needed to prepare the documents
required to be furnished to the appellate court in order to receive appellate review.
54 Id, at 18.
55 Id
56 Id
57 Id. at 18-19 (footnote omitted).
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process protections to the right to appeal a criminal conviction.58 The
Court seemed to suggest that, given what is at stake in a criminal case,
states should aid the appellate process, not hinder it. It appeared to
strike the Court as odd that a state which had a general policy of allowing
criminal appeals, would impose impediments to a defendant's ability to
seek appellate review. In effect, the Court was saying that the state has a
duty, under the due process clause, not to limit the opportunity of an
appeal in a criminal case.
When the prosecutor conditions the acceptance of a guilty plea upon
the waiver of the right to appeal, or agrees, in exchange for the guilty
plea, to drop certain charges against the defendant at the end of the appeals
period, the state undoubtedly hinders the appeals process. In so doing,
the state directly contravenes its duty not to limit the opportunity of crim-
inal appeals.
North Carolina v. Pearce59 further clarified the availability of due pro-
cess protections to preserve an individual's statutory right to appeal.
60
In Pearce, the Supreme Court considered the constitutional ramifications
of subjecting a criminal defendant to greater punishment following a suc-
cessful appeal, retrial and reconviction than the punishment imposed at
his first trial. 61 The defendants in Pearce had received longer sentences
on retrial.6
2
"Although the Court held that the equal protection and double
jeopardy clauses did not constitutionally preclude the trial judge from
imposing a greater sentence, it did find that the imposition of such a
sentence infringed on the defendant's right to appeal in violation of the
due process clause." 63 The Court found that the practice of imposing
heavier sentences upon those who had successfully appealed their cases
would serve to "chill" a defendant's statutory right to appeal.64 The
Court, therefore, required that the reasons for imposing a more severe
sentence after retrial affirmatively appear in the record and be based on
objective information. 65
Due process of law ... requires that vindictiveness against a de-
fendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play
no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial. And since the fear
of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant's exer-
cise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due
process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of
such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge.66
58 See text accompanying notes 54-56.
59 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
60 Borman, supra note 48, at 672.
61 395 U.S. at 713.
62 Id. at 713-14.
63 Borman, supra note 48, at 679.
64 395 U.S. at 724.
65 Id. at 726.
66 Id. at 725. InJune, 1989, the Supreme Court overruled Simpson v. Rice, 395 U.S. 711 (1969),
the companion case to North Carolina v. Pearce, holding that no presumption of vindictiveness
arises when the first sentence is based upon a guilty plea and the second sentence follows a trial.
Alabama v. Smith, 109 S. Ct. 2201, 2202 (1989).
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The Court stressed that "the imposition of a penalty upon the defendant
for having successfully pursued a statutory right of appeal or collateral
remedy would be... a violation of due process of law."
67
In discussing the impact of the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause, Justice Stewart concluded that:
[a] court is "without right to ... put a price on an appeal. A defend-
ant's exercise of a right of appeal must be free and unfettered .... [I]t
is unfair to use the great power given to the court to determine sen-
tence to place a defendant in the dilemma of making an unfree
choice."' 68
Finally, quoting from its decision in Rinaldi v. Yeager69, the Court empha-
sized that while "[t]his Court has never held that the States are required
to establish avenues of appellate review .... it is now fundamental that,
once established, these avenues must be kept free of unreasoned distinc-
tions that can only impede open and equal access to the courts."
'70
In Pearce, then, the Court held that the practice of imposing greater
sentences on retrial following a successful appeal, and the possible deter-
rent effect this practice might have on defendants contemplating an ap-
peal, constitutes an unreasonable impediment to appellate review in
violation of the constitutional right to due process. 71 What violated due
process was the deterrent or impediment that the system had placed on a
criminal defendant's right to appeal. When a state, through the prosecu-
tor, actively seeks to induce a defendant to waive his right to appeal, or
so structures a "bargain" as to cause the implicit waiver of this right, it
likewise creates an unreasonable impediment to appellate review in viola-
tion of the due process clause. If, as Justice Stewart suggests, due pro-
cess means that a defendant's right to appeal must be "free and
unfettered," then plea or sentence bargains conditioned on the defend-
ant's waiver of the right to appeal cannot be tolerated.
Similarly, the state violates due process when it penalizes defendants
for having exercised the statutory right to appeal. 72 The point is that
criminal defendants should never be placed in a position where an exer-
cise of the lawful right to appeal may result in their being "punished."
However, when defendants either expressly agree to waive the right to
appeal as part of a plea bargain, or must implicitly waive that right due to
the terms of the agreement, they find themselves in exactly that position.
By providing coercive incentives to waive the right to appeal, the prose-
cution, in effect, penalizes the election to appeal. The only way to pre-
vent this is to hold such waivers invalid.
Blackledge v. Perry73 provides further insight into the availability of
due process remedies to preserve the statutory protections of a defend-
67 Ia- at 724.
68 Id (quoting Worcester v. Commissioner, 370 F.2d 713, 718 (1st Cir. 1966)).
69 384 U.S. 305, 310-11 (1966).
70 395 U.S. at 724.
71 d at 724-25.
72 Id
73 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
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ant's right to appeal.74 In Blackledge, a North Carolina prison inmate was
charged and convicted of misdemeanor assault with a deadly weapon.
After the defendant filed a notice of appeal, but prior to his appearance
in the superior court, where he had the right to a trial de novo,75 the pros-
ecutor obtained an indictment covering the same conduct, for the felony
offense of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill and inflict seri-
ous bodily injury. 76 The defendant claimed that the felony indictment
constituted a penalty for exercising his statutory right to appeal, and
therefore violated the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. 77
The Supreme Court, relying largely upon its reasoning in North Carolina
v. Pearce, held that the state had violated the protections of the due pro-
cess clause by bringing the felony indictment against the defendant. 78
In Blackledge, the Court focused on the conduct of the prosecutor.
The Court recognized that:
[a] prosecutor clearly has a considerable stake in discouraging con-
victed misdemeanants from appealing and thus obtaining a trial de novo
in the Superior Court, since such an appeal will clearly require in-
creased expenditures of prosecutorial resources before the defend-
ant's conviction becomes final, and may even result in a formerly
convicted defendant's going free. And, if the prosecutor has the
means readily at hand to discourage such appeals-by "upping the
ante" through a felony indictment whenever a convicted misdemean-
ant pursues his statutory appellate remedy-the State can insure that
only the most hardy defendants will brave the hazards of a de novo
trial. 7
9
Blackledge strengthens the contention that a state's practice of condi-
tioning the acceptance of guilty pleas upon defendants' waiver of the
right to appeal, violates due process. In the plea bargain situation, as
well as in the sentence negotiation situation, the focus is likewise upon
the prosecutor's conduct. As the Supreme Court recognized, the prose-
cutor has a clear stake in discouraging a defendant from appealing" and
plea bargaining provides the means to discourage such appeals. By of-
fering attractive "deals" to criminal defendants, a condition of which is
the waiver of the right to appeal, or by structuring the terms of the bar-
74 Borman, supra note 48.
75 Under North Carolina law, a person convicted in the District Court has a right to a trial de
novo in the Superior Court. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7A-290, 15-177.1. The right to trial de novo
is absolute, there being no need for the appellant to allege error in the original proceeding.
When an appeal is taken, the statutory scheme provides that the slate is wiped clean; the
prior conviction is annulled, and the prosecution and the defense begin anew in the Supe-
rior Court.
417 U.S. at 22.
Such a law demonstrates the lengths to which states have been willing to go to afford appellate
review in criminal cases and the importance placed on the concept of review in criminal matters.
For a list of other states which employ a similar two-tiered system, see Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S.
104, 112 n.4 (1972).
76 417 U.S. at 23.
77 Id. at 25. (While the defendant also raised a double jeopardy challenge, the Court found it
necessary to reach only the due process claim.)
78 id. at 28-29.
79 Id. at 27-28 (emphasis added).
80 Id.
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gain to provide that certain unrelated charges against the defendant will
be dropped only after the appeals period for his conviction has run, "the
State can insure that only the most hardy defendants will brave the
hazards" 8' of an appeal. This discouraging effect, coupled with the pros-
ecutor's potential motive to discourage appellate review, led the
Blackledge Court to hold the prosecutor's conduct violative of due pro-
cess. Blackledge erects a due process bar to any systemic mechanism cre-
ated by the state for the purpose of discouraging criminal defendants
from seeking appellate review. A prosecutor's use of the plea bargaining
process to effectuate the waiver of a defendant's right to appeal, is just
such a mechanism.
B. Policy Implications
1. Efficiency Argument Fails
Proponents of plea bargaining often assert that it is necessary for the
efficient operation of the criminal justice system.8 2 Estimates of the per-
centage of criminal defendants who plead guilty range from seventy to
over ninety percent.8 3 For example, in the year ending June 30, 1986,
the United States District Courts dealt with 50,040 criminal defendants;
34,927 of whom pleaded guilty.8 4 Although there are no statistics on the
mechanisms used to achieve those guilty pleas, the vast majority are con-
sidered to be the result of plea bargaining.8 5 A good number of these
plea agreements contain waivers of the right to appeal.86
The primary rationale for plea bargaining is administrative necessity.
ChiefJustice Burger articulated this rationale when he wrote on the state
of the judiciary in 1970. The Chief Justice wrote:
It is elementary, historically and statistically, that systems of courts-the
number of judges, prosecutors and courtrooms-have been based on
the premise that approximately 90 per cent of all defendants will plead
guilty, leaving only 10 per cent, more or less, to be tried. ... The
81 IA at 28.
82 See generally J. BOND supra note 1; O'Hair, Essential! (Plea Bargaining), 64 MICH. B.J. 505 (1984);
Schweitzer, Plea Bargaining: a Prosecutor's View, 61 Wis. B. BULL. 22 (1988); Smith, The Plea Bargaining
Controversy, 77J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 949 (1986); Wright, Plea Bargaining - a necessary tool, 16
CONN. L. REV. 1015 (1984).
83 CRAMER, ROSSMAN & McDONALD, Some Patterns and Determinations of Plea Bargaining Decisions, in
PLEA BARGAINING 77 (W. McDonald &J. Cramer eds. 1980). See also the Notes of Advisory Commit-
tee on Rules in the 1974 Amendment which state that "[a]lthough reliable statistical information is
limited, one recent estimate indicated that guilty pleas account for the disposition of as many as 95%
of all criminal cases .... A substantial number of these are the results of plea discussions." F.R.Cr.P.
11(e); Alschuler, infra note 90, at 50; J. BOND, supra note 1, at 1-2; Chief Justice Burger, infra note
87, at 931.
84 BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STA-
TisTics 1987, U.S. DEPT. OFJUSTICE, table 522 at 422 (1987). See alsoJ. BOND, supra note 1. Bond
asserts that "[r]oughly 90 percent of all defendants plead guilty. The 90 percent figure has acquired
a validity through repetition that may not be entirely justified by the scanty statistics available." Id at
1-2 - 1-3.
85 CRAMER, ROSSMAN & McDONALD, Some Patterns and Determinations of Plea Bargaining Decisions, in
PLEA BARGAINING 77 (W. McDonald &J. Cramer eds. 1980).
86 The court in State v. Gibson, 68 N.J. 499, 508, 348 A.2d 769, 773 (1975), wrote that "while
perhaps most plea agreements do not contain express waivers of appeal or conditions against ap-
peal, many of them do .... Id.
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consequence of what might seem on its face a small percentage change
in the rate of guilty pleas can be tremendous. A reduction from 90 per
cent to 80 per cent in guilty pleas requires the assignment of twice the
judicial manpower and facilities-judges, court reporters, bailiffs, clerks,
jurors and courtrooms. A reduction to 70 per cent trebles this
demand. 8 7
Nonetheless, the argument that courts should permit defendants to
waive their rights to appeal because of the efficiency of the plea bargain-
ing system fails for two reasons. First, questions exist as to whether a
system with plea bargaining is more efficient than one without.8 8 Profes-
sor Malvina Halberstam notes that "even if a greater number of defend-
ants would demand a trial, it does not follow that significantly greater
resources would be needed as a result." 89 The process of plea bargain-
ing may consume more time and resources than a trial.90 For example,
Albert W. Alschuler notes that defense attorneys commonly invoke sev-
eral time consuming strategies to secure a more favorable plea agree-
ment. 9 1 Such strategies range from demanding a jury trial to a string of
pre-trial continuances. The continuances, Alschuler notes, are particu-
larly effective in consuming time because obtaining the continuance itself
consumes the court's time. 92 Another strategy is the calling of multiple
defense witnesses. 9 3 The time consuming strategies have the double ef-
87 Burger, The State oftheJudiciary-1970, 56 A.B.A.J. 929, 931 (1970). See also Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (stating that the government would have to greatly increase the
number ofjudges and facilities if every criminal charge went to trial).
88 One jurisdiction, Alaska, has abolished plea bargaining entirely. In his work, PLEA BARGAIN-
ING AND GUILTY PLEAS, James E. Bond writes that:
injuly 1975 the state Attorney General declared an official statewide ban on plea bargain-
ing to take effect on August 15, 1975. Although plea bargaining had been partially and
experimentally forbidden in a few other American jurisdictions, these experiments were
cautious and limited in scope. The Alaska prohibition, while not absolute, contained very
few exceptions to the general rule that "District Attorneys... will refrain from engaging in
plea negotiations ..."
A recent, thoroughly documented study of the Alaskan experiment .... concluded that
the ban effectively curtailed plea bargaining.
J. BOND, supra note 1, at 1-2 1. The study also concluded that the ban accelerated thejudicial process
rather than impeded it. Id. at 1-22. See generally M. RUBINSTEIN, S. CLARKE & T. WITE, ALASKA BANS
PLEA BARGAINING (1980).
89 Halberstam, Towards Neutral Principles in the Administration of CriminalJustice: A Critique of Supreme
Court Decisions Sanctioning the Plea Bargaining Process, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 37 (1982).
Halberstam writes that underlying the efficiency argument are two assumptions:
a) that without sentencing leverage to induce guilty pleas, the number of pleas would de-
crease and the number of trials would increase significantly; and b) that the increase in trials
would require substantially greater prosecutorial and judicial resources than is currently
required. Both are factual assumptions that have not been validated empirically.
Id. at 36. Halberstam also points out that "[w]hile a trial takes more time than the entry of a guilty
plea, considerable court and attorney time is lost by motions, for adjournment and other pretrial
maneuvers related to plea bargaining." Id. at 37.
90 Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50, 58 (1968).
91 Id. at 56-58.
92 Id. at 56.
93 Alschuler relates a case in which plea negotiations had broken down and the case went to trial.
After the assistant district attorney asked that the defense witnesses be excluded from the court-
room, he watched as twenty-five witnesses left the courtroom. At that point, he approached the
defense counsel and accepted the counsel's proposal for a five year suspended sentence. Id. at 57.
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fect of pressuring the prosecution to bargain and weakening the prosecu-
tion's case by the passage of time.94
Second, even if plea bargaining does improve the efficiency of our
justice system, nothing indicates that the waiver of appellate rights is an
indispensible part of plea bargaining. No statistics are available on the
percentage of plea bargains that include a waiver of the right to appeal.
Nonetheless, incidents of appeal would not increase greatly if courts pro-
hibited defendants from waiving their rights to appeal because few de-
fendants will chance forfeiting their bargains by bringing appeals. 95 For
those who are willing to take such a chance, the judicial system should
ensure that they have the opportunity to appeal. Courts should allow a
means through which the defendant can correct injustices in plea bar-
gaining. In short, the importance of the appeal both to the system and to
the individual defendants greatly outweighs whatever efficiency the sys-
tem receives by permitting the waiver of the right to appeal.
2. Analogy to the Ability to Waive other Rights Fails
Since defendants may waive some fundamental constitutional rights,
the argument goes, they may waive the statutory right to appeal.96 This
assertion ignores the reasoning behind allowing defendants to waive
some of their constitutional rights. None of the reasons that courts have
given for allowing defendants to waive constitutional rights, supports
the waiver of the right to appeal.97
The right to a trial by jury is constitutionally guaranteed.98 None-
theless, the Supreme Court in Patton v. United States99 held that defend-
ants may waive this right. The Court reasoned that the defendant can
waive the right to jury trial because it was established for the defendant's
protection. "[T]he framers of the Constitution were intent upon pre-
serving the right of trial by jury primarily for the protection of the ac-
cused."' 100 The Court concluded that "Art III, section 2 ... was meant to
confer a right upon the accused which he may forego at his election. To
deny his power to do so is to convert a privilege into an imperative
requirement."' 0 1
94 IdL at 56 n.23.
95 See generally Note, The Consequences of Appealing Plea Bargain Agreements: Prisoners Face Increased
Sentences on Retrial after Vacated Convictions, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 556 (1986).
96 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
97 See, e.g., People v. Charles, 171 Cal. App. 3d 552, 217 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1983); People v.
Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d 1, 9, 541 N.E.2d 1022, 1025, 543 N.Y.S.2d 968, 971 (1989).
98 U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
The trial of all crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial
shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not
committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may
by Law have directed.
99 281 U.S. 276 (1929), overruled on other grounds, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
100 Id at 297.
101 Id. at 298.
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The Court in Johnson v. Zerbst,102 applied the same reasoning to the
sixth amendment guarantee of the right to counsel.' 0 3 According to the
Court, the "purpose of the constitutional guaranty of a right to counsel is
to protect an accused from conviction resulting from his own ignorance
of his legal and constitutional rights, ... "-104 The Court held that as a
result, defendants may intelligently waive the protection that the consti-
tutional right to counsel provides. 10 5
Finally, the Court in Smith v. United States 106 held that defendants
may waive their fifth amendment rights to prosecution by indictment. 107
The Smith court adopted the reasoning of United States v. Gill.'0 8 In Gill,
the court applied the Patton reasoning. "It would seem that the reason-
ing of the court in the Patton Case should apply with equal force.., and
that the provision of the Fifth Amendment requiring an indictment in
capital or other infamous cases creates a personal privilege which the
defendant may waive."' 0 9 In sum, the reason behind allowing defend-
ants to waive these constitutional rights is that these rights were guaran-
teed for the protection of defendants.
Clearly, the right to appeal also protects the defendant. Nonetheless,
to conclude as a result, that this right may be waived is to overlook the
other important policies underlying the right to appeal. Two important
functions of appeals are (1) the development of the common law1 10 and
(2) the maintenance of judicial integrity. 1 " Though these reasons may
102 304 U.S. 458 (1937).
103 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
Id.
104 Johnson, 304 U.S. at 465.
105 Id.
106 360 U.S. 1 (1958).
107 Id. at 6.
108 55 F.2d 399 (D. N.M. 1931).
109 Id. at 403.
110 RobertJ. Martineau %,rites that one purpose of appellate review is:
[t]o provide an opportunity for the common law to develop, thereby permitting it to reflect
the demands of the individuals and institutions that the laws serve as well as to accommo-
date factual situations substantially different from those in prior cases. The development
function is crucial in a common law jurisdiction which requires courts to make law, not
simply apply law as declared by a legislative body.
R. MARTINEAU, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN APPELLATE ADVOCACY 2 (1985).
111 Paul D. Carrington, Daniel J. Meador and Maurice Rosenberg note that it is "emphatically
true for this country's [legal system] that appellate courts serve as the instrument of accountability
for those who make the basic decisions in trial courts and administrative agencies." P. CARRINGTON,
D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 2 (1976). By way of elaboration, Carrington, Mea-
dor and Rosenberg write that the appellate process
assures litigants that the decision in their case is not prey to the failings of whichever mortal
happened to render it, but bears the institutional imprimatur and approval of the whole
social order as represented by its legal system. Thus, the review for correctness serves to
reinforce the dignity, authority and acceptability of the trial, and to control the adverse
effects of any personal shortcomings of the basic decision maker.
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not be the primary reasons behind the right, they are sufficiently valid to
prohibit courts from allowing defendants to waive their rights to appeal.
a. Waivers Impede the Development of the Common Law
Plea bargaining and allowing the waiver of the right to appeal frus-
trate the development and refinement of the common law. As Professors
Newman and NeMoyer note, the "great issues and conflicts in modem
American criminal law, ranging from the Miranda warnings to disputes
over different tests of insanity, are rendered largely irrelevant by guilty
pleas."' 12 Albert W. Alschuler wrote that the frustration of the develop-
ment of law through using the guilty plea is particularly problematic with
respect to "procedural defenses [which have] not been previously liti-
gated."1 3 Assuming that plea bargains are necessary, the judicial system
must not further restrict the development of law by permitting the waiver
of the right to appeal.
As the Supreme Court of New Jersey recognized, appeals from plea
bargains will be few enough that the system would not be greatly
taxed.1 4 The court in State v. Gibson noted that:
[p]rosecutors will recognize that the case will be a rare one in which a
defendant who has received concessions as to sentences or charges for
an agreement not to appeal a collateral conviction will be willing to
forfeit those benefits for the, at best, uncertain prospects of securing a
reversal, with the equal uncertainty, in most cases, as to the outcome
of a retrial.115
Though few defendants would appeal from plea bargains, the courts
must permit all defendants the oppurtunity to appeal because of the pos-
sible impact these cases may have on the development of the common
law. Generally, appeals from plea bargains would occur where the status
of the law is unclear, as evidenced by the defendants' vacillation between
accepting a bargain and asserting a particular defense which will result in
a loss of the bargain. 116 Since appeals will be rare and the law may be in
question, the courts should not allow defendants to waive the right to
appeal.
b. The Interest ofJudicial Integrity Requires the Prohibition of Waivers
The maintenance ofjudicial integrity has long been recognized as an
important concern. Justices Holmes and Brandeis articulated the con-
112 Newman & NeMoyer, Issues of Propriety in Negotiated Justice, 47 DEN. LJ. 367, 369 (1970).
113 Alschuler, supra note 90, at 81. Alschuler writes:
[i]n this situation, plea negotiation provides an effective mechanism for circumventing the
development of new law. Boston defense attorney Joseph S. Oteri expresses surprise, for
example, that the well-known case of [Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964)] ever reached
the Supreme Court. "I had a case that presented the same situation several years earlier,"
Oteri says. "My trial briefs were written, but I never had to use them . . The two of us
reached a very satisfactory agreement."
Id.
114 68 N.J. 499, 348 A.2d 769 (1975).
115 Id. at 512-13, 348 A.2d at 776.
116 See Alschuler, supra note 90, at 56-58.
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cern in their dissenting opinions in Olmstead v. United States.117 In Olm-
stead, the defendants were convicted of violating the National Prohibition
Act. 118 The government unlawfully obtained the crucial evidence by wire
tapping the defendant's telephones. 19 Holmes' and Brandeis' opinions
objected to this practice. Justice Holmes thought "it a less evil that some
criminals should escape than that the Government should play an igno-
ble part."'120 According to Holmes, "no distinction can be taken between
the Government as prosecutor and the Government as judge."' 2 1 On
the issue of judicial integrity, Justice Brandeis wrote:
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imper-
illed if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the
potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the
whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government
becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man
to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the
administration of the criminal law end justifies the means-to declare
that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the convic-
tion of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against
that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.'
22
In McNabb v. United States,123 the Supreme Court adopted the views
of Holmes and Brandeis on judicial integrity. In McNabb, the police se-
cured a confession from the accused during an unlawful detention.
2 4
The Court noted that affirming a conviction based on such a confession
reflects negatively on the judiciary. "Plainly, a conviction resting on evi-
dence secured through such a flagrant disregard of the procedure cannot
be allowed to stand without making the courts themselves accomplices in
the willful disobedience of law."'
25
By allowing prosecutors to secure from defendants a waiver of their
rights to appeal, courts are becoming accomplices to police violations
and trial court errors. Injustice taints the entire court system when al-
leged police violations and trial court errors are rendered permanently
isolated from review. Courts must be allowed to review alleged errors
and violations in order to maintain the integrity of the United States'
legal system.
In considering the analogy between the right to appeal and other
rights, the Seaberg court also noted interests beyond the protection of the
accused.' 26 With respect to rights that the defendant may not waive,
117 277 U.S. 438 (1928), (Brandeis, J., and Holmes, J., dissenting).
118 Id. at 455.
119 Id. at 456-57.
120 Id. at 470.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 485.
123 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
124 Id. at 345.
125 Id.
126 One of the defendants contended that like the right to a speedy trial, the right to appeal
should not be subject to waiver because it involves "matters in which the interests of society tran-
scend the individual concerns of the defendant .... Similarly, a defendant may not waive the right to
challenge the legality of a sentence.., or his competency to stand trial." Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d at 9, 541
N.E.2d at 1025, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 971.
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such as the right to a speedy trial127, the right to challenge the legality of
a sentence128 or the defendant's competency to stand trial, 129 the court
stated that "[t]hese rights are recognized as a matter of fairness to the
accused but they also embrace the reality of fairness in the process itself,
therefore, a defendant may not waive them."' 30 The court then con-
cluded that the right to appeal "does not implicate society's interest in
the integrity of criminal process."''1 The court ignored society's sub-
stantial interests in the integrity of the judicial system and the develop-
ment and refinement of law.
The court also stated that to the extent the right to appeal does im-
plicate society's interest, "that interest is protected by the procedural and
substantive requirements imposed on the Trial Judge before the defend-
ant may be sentenced."'' 3 2 The requirements to which the court referred
were that the judge "must exercise his or her responsibility at the time of
sentencing in the light of information obtained from the presentence re-
port or other source"' 33 and that the judge may not "refuse both to
honor the promise and to vacate the plea taken."'' 3 4 Such requirements
do not sufficiently protect society's interest in maintaining the integrity
of the court. They do nothing to prevent ajudge, who has committed an
error but fears reversal, from consenting to a deal which conditions a
sentence recommendation on the waiver of right to appeal.
C. Effects on Habeas Corpus Relief
Unlike other rights which a defendant may waive, the waiving of the
right to appeal entails serious consequences with respect to post-convic-
tion relief. In most instances, by waiving the right to appeal, defendants
are waiving their rights to seek habeas corpus relief.' 35 The Court in Fay
127 The right to a speedy trial may be waived by failure to move for dismissal on that ground
during trial. As LaFave and Israel note, "[i]f the defendant fails to so move and instead enters a
guilty plea or submits to trial, he may not raise the issue for the first time on appeal." W. LAFAVE &J.
ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 686 (1985).





133 People v. Farrar, 52 N.Y.2d 302, 306, 419 N.E.2d 864, 865, 437 N.Y.S.2d 961, 962 (1981).
134 People v. McConnell, 49 N.Y.2d 340, 346, 402 N.E.2d 133, 135-36, 425 N.Y.S.2d 794, 797
(1981).
135 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982) delineates the right to habeas corpus.
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge or a district court shall entertain an
application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a state court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Consti-
tution or laws or treaties of the United States.
Id.
Habeas corpus is a route the prisoner may use to challenge detention.
The writ of habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding
him to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and
cause of his caption and detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the court or
judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf. The writ is the process of testing the
authority of one who deprives another of his liberty, and it is designed to give a person
whose liberty is restrained an immediate hearing to inquire into and determine the legality
of the detention ....
39 CJ.S. Habeas Corpus § 2 (1976).
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V. Noia,13 6 held that an act such as waiving the right to appeal may bar
defendants from seeking habeas corpus relief.1 3 7 The Court stated that
"the federal habeas corpus judge may in his discretion deny relief to an
applicant who has deliberately by-passed the orderly procedure" of the
state courts and in so doing has forfeited his state remedies."' 138 A
waiver of the right to appeal is, by definition, a deliberate by-pass of the
state court's procedure.
13 9
A court is particularly likely to deny defendants' applications for
habeas corpus when defendants waive their rights to appeal as part of a
plea bargain rather than a negotiated sentence. For example, the Court
in Tollett v. Henderson 140 stated that "[w]hen a criminal defendant has sol-
emnly admitted in open-court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with
which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims re-
lating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to
entry of the guilty plea." 14 1 A recent application of the Court's standard
reflects defendants' chances of obtaining habeas corpus relief under the
discretion of the federal judge after waiving their rights to appeal. In
Rodriquez v. Henderson, 14 2 the court denied the petitioner's application for
habeas corpus relief stating simply that "he intentionally waived his right
to appeal and had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his cause in state
court." 1
43
In sum, when defendants waive their rights to appeal, the judge in a
federal habeas corpus hearing has the discretion to deny the defendants'
applications for habeas corpus on the grounds that the defendants failed
to assert their claims in the state proceedings in accordance with state
procedural requirements. Case law indicates that federal relief is unlikely
to follow waivers of the right to appeal, especially when the defendants
waive their rights to appeal during plea bargaining and enter a plea of
guilty. 144 Thus, by waiving the right to appeal, defendants in most cases
136 372 U.S. 391 (1963), overruled, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
137 Waiving the right to appeal may result in a procedural default. Wayne R. LaFave andJerold
H. Israel write that the
procedural default question arises when a petitioner failed to present his claim in the state
proceedings in accordance with applicable state procedural requirements and the state has
held (or would so hold under well established precedent) that this lapse bars consideration
of the claim on the merits.
W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1035 (1985).
138 Fay, 372 U.S. at 438.
139 The Court in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), replaced the "deliberate by-pass"
standard of Fay, adopting a standard which it developed in Francis v. Henderson. Id. at 91. The Francis
standard states, "[iun a collateral attack upon a conviction the rule requires ... not only a showing of
'cause' for the defendant's failure to [assert a particular defense] but also a showing of actual preju-
dice." 425 U.S. 536, 542 (1976). Thus, Wainwright substantially limited the availability of habeas
corpus relief for defendants who waived their right to appeal. The by-passing of the state proce-
dures no longer needs to be deliberate for the judge in the habeas proceedings to deny relief. Wain-
wright at 87-88. This development is irrelevant to plea bargains since they meet the higher standard
of "deliberate by-pass. See Murray v. Carrier 477 U.S. 478 (1986) (for a discussion of the cause and
prejudice standard).
140 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
141 Id. at 267.
142 No. 88 Cir. 3614 (S.D.N.Y.July 17, 1989) (LExIS, Genfed library, Courts file).
143 Id.
144 For example, within one year, the waiver of the right to appeal was a factor in the federal
court's denial of relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, vacation of sentence statute, in the following cases:
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are also forfeiting the possibility of collateral relief through habeas
corpus proceedings. The waiver of the right to appeal results in much
greater consequences than the American legal system should be pre-
pared to allow.
IV. Arguments Against Waivers are Magnified at the Sentencing
Stage
Waivers of the right to appeal are more offensive when prosecutors
procure them during the sentence negotiation stage which follows a trial
throughout which the defendants maintained their innocence. At this
stage, defendants' only bargaining tools are rights to appeal.1 45 This sit-
uation is distinct from the pre-conviction stage where the defendants
have much more with which to bargain 146 and many of the points for
appeal may not have occurred yet. Also, unlike pre-trial waivers that ac-
company plea agreements, post-conviction waivers accompany defend-
ants' assertions of innocence throughout the judicial process.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey recognized this distinction. 147
The court wrote that "a defendant who has never admitted his guilt
should, as we view the interests ofjustice and appropriate policy consid-
erations, not be deemed to have irrevocably waived his right of direct
appeal from a conviction unless he fails to file an appeal within the time
provided therefor by law."148 Thus, the system of negotiating an im-
pending sentence pressures defendants to waive their rights to appeal in
order to bargain, even when they still maintain their innocence.
Another argument against the waiver of the right to appeal at the
sentence negotiation stage is that upon conviction, both the judge and
the prosecutor have a common interest, i.e., seeing the conviction with-
stand appeal. As one of the defendants in Seaberg argued, negotiated
sentences should be subject to appellate review "to protect the interests
of defendants and the interests of society. [The defendant asserted] that
Kinney v. United States, 177 F.2d 895 (10th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 922 (1950); Hahn v.
United States, 178 F.2d 11 (10th Cir. 1949); Michner v. United States, 177 F.2d 422 (8th Cir. 1949),
appealfiled, 181 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1950); Moss v. United States, 177 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 933 (1950); Alfred v. United States, 177 F.2d 193 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 921 (1950); Martyn v. United States, 176 F.2d 609 (8th Cir. 1949); United States v. Wight, 176
F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950 (1950); Crowe v. United States, 175 F.2d 799 (4th
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950, reh. denied, 339 U.S. 916 (1950); Doll v. United States, 175 F.2d
884 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 874 (1949); Dickerson v. United States, 175 F.2d 440 (4th Cir.
1949); Carroll v. United States, 174 F.2d 412 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 874 (1949).
145 Ofcourse, the value of this bargaining chip depends upon the degree to which the conviction
is suspect. Nonetheless, the case law may not be well developed in the applicable area.
146 The greatest weapon in defendants' arsenals when they meet the prosecutor to negotiate is
the right to put the prosecution to its proof. As Alschuler writes: "Because calender considerations
are so important a part of the plea bargaining process, defense attorneys commonly devise strategies
whose only utility lies in the threat that they pose to the courrs and the prosecutor's time." Al-
schuler, supra note 90, at 50,. As the Court in Santobello v. New York wrote, the fear is that "[i]f every
criminal charge were subjected to a full scale trial, the States and the F~deral Government would
need to multiply by many'times the number ofjudges and court facilities. 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
Included in the strategies used by defense attorneys are demanding the right to trial by jury, prose-
cution by indictment, the right to bring witnesses, etc. These strategies are particularly potent
against prosecutors with traditionally heavy caseloads. See generally Alschuler, supra note 90, at 56-58.
147 State v. Gibson, 68 N.J. 499, 512, 348 A.2d 769, 775 (1975).
148 Id'
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defendants must be protected from misconduct and coercion in the
pleading process and ensured fairness in sentencing."' 149 The court re-
jected these arguments stating that they "overlook the role of the trial
court and its obligation to insure the reasonableness of the bargain
struck and of the sentence imposed."' 150 The court has overlooked the
possibility that the trial judge may not always be the objective insurer
that the system would hope.
In Worcester v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 15i the court held that a
judge may not participate in sentence negotiation because of the possi-
bility of abuse. "A judge who fears he has committed reversible error
during the trial, and does not like the thought of being reversed, [may
inform] the defendant that he is considering a substantial sentence, but
that if the defendant will demonstrate his repentance ... by waiving ap-
peal, he will suspend it." 152
Although Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11153 now prohibits a
judge from participating in sentence negotiation, the court's reasoning in
Worcester illustrates a problem with the system of negotiating sentences
based on waiver of appeal. The court recognized the potential for a
judge to offer a lighter sentence conditioned on the waiving of the right
to appeal because the judge feared reversal.154 The court held that such
a practice was inconsistent with the role of the judge as an objective
overseer.155
Following the reasoning of the Worcester court to its logical conclu-
sion, the judge should also be barred from accepting negotiated sentence
agreements which include the waiver of the right to appeal. Worcester rec-
149 Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d at 8, 541 N.E.2d at 1025, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 971.
150 Id.
151 370 F.2d 713 (1st Cir. 1966).
152 Id. at 718.
153 F.R.Cr.P. 11 (e) Plea Agreement Procedure:
(1) In General. The attorney for the government and the attorney for the defendant
... may engage in discussions with a view toward reaching an agreement that, upon the
entering of a plea of guilty... to a charged offense or to a lesser or related offense, the
attorney for the government will do any of the following:
(A) move for dismissal of other charges; or
(B) make a recommendation, or agree not to oppose the defendant's request, for a
particular sentence, with the understanding that such recommendation or request shall not
be binding upon the court; or
(C) agree that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the case. The court
shall not participate in any such discussions.
154 The court in Worcester wrote: "We cannot try the mind of the judge to assess whether his
motives in offering the defendant a valuable consideration to waive appeal (and we can think of little
more valuable than not going to jail) were good or bad." Worcester, 370 F.2d at 718.
155 Id. The court stated that "it is unfair to use the great threat given to the court to determine
sentence to place the defendant in the dilemma of making an unfree choice." Id. The advisory com-
mittee on the rules laid out the reasoning behind prohibiting the court from participating in plea
discussions. The committee writes:
There are valid reasons for a judge to avoid involvement in plea discussions. It might lead
the defendant to believe that he would not receive a fair trial, were there a trial before the
same judge. The risk of not going along with the disposition apparently desired by the
judge might induce the defendant to plead guilty, even if innocent. Such involvement
makes it difficult for a judge to objectively assess the voluntariness of the plea .... When a
judge becomes a participant in plea bargaining be brings to bear the full force and majesty
of his office.
Notes on Advisory Committee on Rules-1974 Amendment.
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ognized that some judges may fear reversal. For the judge who fears
reversal, once a jury or the judge finds a defendant guilty after trial, the
judge has an interest in seeing that the conviction withstands appeal.
This interest is synonymous with the prosecutor's interest.
If, as the Worcester court held, the judge is not to negotiate an appeal
because of a conflict of interest, then that judge must also not oversee a
sentence negotiation which includes a waiver of the right to appeal. A
judge who fears reversal will be as inclined to accept an unfair bargain
which is conditioned on the defendant waiving her right to appeal as the
judge would be to offer such a bargain if he were permitted to join in the
negotiations.1 5 6 In fact, the judge may be more inclined to accept an
unfair bargain than he would be to offer an unfair bargain because his
participation is much more subtle.
For example, under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,1 57
before accepting a plea of guilty, the court need only advise the defend-
ants of the nature of the charge, that they have the right to representa-
tion, to plead not guilty and be tried by a jury, that by pleading guilty
they waive their right to trial and that anything they say may be used
against them in a prosecution for perjury.15 8 The court must also deter-
mine that the plea is voluntary and that there is some factual basis for the
plea.' 59 These requirements are not substantial. Courts could easily ad-
vise the defendants of all these rights, determine voluntariness and fac-
tual basis, and still accept bargains that are unfair to the defendants. For
example, none of these requirements prevents courts from accepting
pleas that include waivers of the right to appeal in spite of possible police
violations or judicial error.
156 This reasoning extends beyond the situation where the judge accepts a bargain known to be
unfair. The judge, in perfectly good faith, may believe that the bargain is fair and is the proper
determination of the case but fear reversal which in the judge's mind would be unfair.
157 F.R.Cr.P. 11 delineates the role of the trial judge in accepting a plea of guilty:
(C) Advice to Defendant. Before accepting a plea of guilty.... the court must address the
defendant personally in open court and inform him of, and determine that he understands,
the following:
(I) the nature of the charge ....
(2) if the defendant is not represented by an attorney, that he has the right to be
represented by an attorney ....
(3) that he has the right to plead not guilty. . ., and he has the right to be tried by
a jury and at that trial has the right to the assistance of counsel, the right to confront
and cross-examine witnesses against him, and the right not to be compelled to incrimi-
nate himself; and
(4) that if his plea of guilty.., is accepted by the court there will not be a further
trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty ... he waives the right to a trial; and
(5) if the court intends to question the defendant.., that his answers may later
be used against him in a prosecution for perjury or false statement.
(d) Insuring that the Plea is Voluntary. The court shall not accept a plea of guilty ...
without first determining that the plea is voluntary and not the result of force or threats or
of promises apart from a plea agreement ....
(e) Determining Accuracy of Plea. Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the
court should not enter a judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall
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V. Conclusion
The waiver of a criminal defendant's right to appeal is an unaccept-
able condition of a sentence or plea bargain. The practice of condition-
ing the acceptance of sentence or plea bargains upon defendants waiving
their rights to appeal represents a systemic deprivation of defendants'
rights to have their convictions reviewed. Consequently, it violates the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Society has an interest
in criminal appeals because they afford an added degree of protection
against errors and irregularities in the criminal justice process that can
result in the loss of life, liberty or property of the accused. The right to
appeal a criminal conviction has become too integral a part of the crimi-
nal justice system to be sacrificed in the name of "efficiency". To the
extent that the right to appeal implicates judicial integrity and contrib-
utes to the development of our law, it is unlike other rights criminal de-
fendants routinely waive. As evidenced in the context of habeas corpus
proceedings, such waivers effectively cut off all remedial avenues open to
a defendant for bringing errors in the criminal process to the court's
attention.
Courts should hold that such waivers are invalid. At present, this is a
minority view. The courts that have yet to address the issue of permit-
ting appeal waivers should recognize that the right to appeal a criminal
conviction has taken on added significance as a safeguard in a system that
depends so heavily upon plea-based convictions for its administration.
Gregory M Dyer
Brendan Judge
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